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Abstract 
At the EU Council in December 2004, European heads of governments will decide on a 
potential date for the start of EU accession negotiations with Turkey. Various recent analyses 
assess the cost of applying the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP) to Turkey 
without taking into account the specific structure of the agricultural sector in Turkey, which 
would determine the receipts from EU funds. This paper assesses potential budgetary effects 
resulting from the application of the CAP to Turkey, if Turkey should accede in 2014. The 
analysis is based on macroeconomic projections from the literature, equilibrium modelling of 
the Turkish agricultural sector, and projections of the future development of the CAP. It is 
found that total EU budgetary outlays for the application of the CAP to Turkey could total 
about €3.3 billion in 2014 and rise to €5 billion in 2024 due to full phasing in of direct 
payments and rural development policies. The resulting net transfer under the CAP to Turkey 
would be about €1.6 billion in 2014 and could increase to €2.6 billion in 2024. Such sums 
take a backseat to projected transfers under the structural policy of the EU and the overall 
political project of including Turkey in the EU. 
Keywords: Turkey, EU accession, CAP, budgetary effects 
Zusammenfassung 
Im Dezember 2004 wird der Europäische Rat über die Festlegung eines Zeitpunkts zur 
Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei entscheiden. Die Diskussion über die 
aus der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU (GAP) resultierenden Budgetwirkungen eines EU-
Beitritts basiert bisher meist auf Schätzungen, die die spezifische Struktur des türkischen 
Agrarsektors sowie zukünftige Änderungen der GAP bis zu einem Beitritt der Türkei kaum 
einbeziehen. In diesem Beitrag werden die aus der GAP resultierenden Budgetwirkungen 
eines potentiellen EU-Beitritts der Türkei im Jahr 2014 auf Grundlage der Literatur 
entnommener makroökonomischer Projektionen, Abschätzungen zukünftiger Änderungen der 
GAP sowie einem Gleichgewichtsmodell des türkischen Agrarsektors analysiert. Im Ergebnis 
ergeben sich EU-Zahlungen an die Türkei im Rahmen der GAP von insgesamt 3,3 Mrd. € im 
Jahr 2014, die nach einer schrittweisen Einführung des vollen Umfangs der GAP im Jahre 
2024 etwa 5 Mrd. € betragen. Der sich aus der GAP potentiell ergebende Netto-Transfer aus 
dem EU-Budget an die Türkei beträgt 1,6 Mrd. € im Jahr 2014 und steigt bis 2024 auf etwa 
2,6 Mrd. € an. Im Verhältnis zu den sich voraussichtlich aus der europäischen Strukturpolitik 
ergebenden Transfers und dem politischen Gesamtvorhaben einer Integration der Türkei sind 
diese Summen eher unbedeutend. 
Schlüsselwörter: Türkei, EU-Beitritt, Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik, Budgetwirkungen  
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1 Introduction 
At the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999, Turkey gained candidate status for full EU 
membership. European heads of governments will decide on a potential date for the start of 
accession negotiations at the EU Council in December 2004. The start of negotiations in 2005 
seems possible if Turkey fulfils the political Copenhagen criteria laid out as prerequisites for 
the start of negotiations, and if the political will in the EU is sufficient. Nonetheless, a long 
period of accession negotiations is expected and many observers believe that accession will 
not take place before 2014, which is the first year of the Financial Perspective by the EU 
starting in 2014. Therefore, at this point an assessment of the budgetary effects resulting from 
the application of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to Turkey is arbitrary, as the 
CAP changes quickly. For this reason, recent analyses were limited to assessing the effects of 
full agricultural market integration between Turkey and the EU, without application of the 
CAP to Turkey (GRETHE, 2004; CAKMAK and KASNAKOGLU, 2001).  
Even so, the public discussion on the cost of accession has started: a widely cited study of 
QUAISSER and REPPEGATHER (2004) estimates total EU expenditure for applying the current 
CAP to Turkey at €4.4 to 5.4 billion. This estimate is based on a regression analysis applied 
to the EU-25 sample with agricultural value added and agricultural production value in the 
individual member states as explanatory variables for EU budgetary outlays for full 
implementation of the CAP. Such an approach, of course, does not account for the specific 
production structure of Turkey, nor does it account for the variables which play a major role 
in the allocation of rural development funds, which are agricultural area, agricultural 
employment, and per capita income. In addition, it seems unlikely that the current level of 
direct payments to agricultural producers in the EU, which accounts for more than 60 percent 
of budgetary outlays for the CAP, will survive until the year 2013, which QUAISSER and 
REPPEGATHER take as a potential accession year. DERVIS et al. (2004a) estimate the cost of the 
CAP applied to Turkey in 2015 at about €8 billion, based on the assumption that Turkey's 
GDP at that time would be around €400 billion with a 10 percent share of the agricultural 
sector. Therefore if the current EU-15 level of budgetary outlays for the CAP relative to 
agricultural GDP of roughly 20 percent were maintained, CAP outlays for Turkey would be 
20 percent of €40 billion, or €8 billion. This is considered an upper bound as no changes in 
the CAP until 2015 are taken into account. FLAM (2003) estimates annual EU budgetary 
outlays for Turkey as an EU member, including structural policies, at €17 billion and Turkey's  
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contribution to the EU budget at about €5 billion. This estimate is based on a regression 
analysis for the EU-15 sample, which takes GDP as the explanatory variable for the 
contribution to the EU budget, and eligibility for the cohesion funds and council voting power 
as explanatory variables for receipts from the EU budget. Obviously, in transferring these 
results to the accession candidates at that time, no budgetary limits are taken into account; 
total net transfers to the then 13 accession candidates are estimated at about €50 billion 
annually (FLAM 2003, p. 45). Furthermore, changes in EU policies since the base period for 
estimation (1999/2000) are not taken into consideration. None of these recent analyses is 
based on the specific structure of the agricultural sector in Turkey, which would determine the 
receipts from EU funds.  
Some sector specific analyses were carried out after Turkey's application for full membership 
in 1987. MANEGOLD (1988) provides an estimate of the budgetary outlays resulting from the 
CAP applied to Turkey based on Turkish agricultural production and CAP provisions in 1986 
of about €4 billion, compared to a Turkish contribution to the EU budget of €740 million. 
AKDER et al. (1990) estimate the cost of the CAP applied to Turkey at €3.1 billion in 1995. 
But the CAP has changed a great deal since the end of the 1980s making these assessments of 
limited validity today. The EU Commission apparently calculated budgetary effects of 
Turkish accession, as Commissioner Fischler recently stated that the budgetary outlays for 
applying the CAP to Turkey would be at €11.3 billion (AgraEurope, 2004a). 
Although current quantitative analyses available are limited in detail, it is clear that the 
budgetary concerns with respect to Turkish accession are comprehensible, if one looks at 
basic indicators of the Turkish economy compared to the EU presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Basic Economic Indicators in Turkey and the EU-25 









GDP (2003, bill. €)
b  9,738.9 437.1 68.1 212.3  2.2%
GDPPPS per capita (2003, €/year)
b  23,270 11,302 6,331 5,750  24.7%
GDP of the agr. sector (2003, bill. €)  194.8 15.7 7.8 31.4  16.1%










Share of employment in agriculture. (EU 







a FAO (2004), 
b EUROSTAT (2004), 
c SIS (2004a), 
d EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004a), 
e SIS (2003), 
f 
SIS (2004b), 
g EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004b), own calculations. 
Table 1 shows that Turkey is a large country in terms of population, and has a large 
agricultural sector, measured by production value as well as agricultural GDP. In terms of 
population and agricultural production value Turkey is comparable to the 10 new member 
states (NMS-10). With regard to the role of the agricultural sector in the economy as well as 
per capita income, Turkey equals Bulgaria and Romania in shares of agriculture in 
employment and GDP, and per capita GDP in purchasing power standard (GDPPPS). 
Compared to the EU-25, the Turkish economy is small; total Turkish GDP is only slightly 
more than 2 percent of that of the EU-25. Based on this data Turkey would become a 
significant net recipient under current EU policies because of high transfers under the EU 
structural and agricultural policies and a low contribution to the EU budget due to a low GDP. 
This is precisely what is reflected in the studies cited above. Yet Turkey will not accede 
today, nor in the immediate future. Until accession, many determining factors such as 
macroeconomic variables and the design of the CAP will change. 
Against this background, this paper roughly assesses the order of magnitude of effects on the 
EU budget resulting from the application of the CAP to Turkey should Turkey accede in 
2014. To this aim, Section 2 outlines the challenge of assessing budgetary effects resulting 
from the CAP in case of accession and a potential comprehensive analytical framework. 
Subsequently, a less exhaustive approach followed in this paper is described. In Section 3 the 
amount of direct payments which would result from the current CAP as well as under further 
reform scenarios for Turkey is estimated. This is based on the results of a partial equilibrium 
model (TURKSIM) analysis of full integration of Turkish and EU agricultural markets for the 
year 2006 (see GRETHE, 2004). In Section 4 potential payments from the EU budget to Turkey  
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under the so-called second pillar of the CAP are examined, including a heterogeneous 
collection of rural development policies. Finally Section 5 summarizes findings, presents 
potential net effects on the EU budget, and draws some conclusions. 
2 Analytical  Approach 
In the event of accession, Turkey would not only be subject to the market price level resulting 
from various market policies under the CAP, but to the CAP itself which is mainly financed 
by the EU budget. Of main concern are the policies of direct payments to producers under the 
first pillar of the CAP, and payments under the second pillar of the CAP which includes 
various types of rural development measures, e.g. payments under environmental programs 
and investment subsidies. 
Due to the long period expected before accession, the time component is extremely important 
when analysing the effects of applying the CAP to Turkey. Three areas of interest play a 
major role, not least, the state of the CAP itself. Many reforms of the CAP yet to be 
implemented are already determined, including partial decoupling of direct payments under 
the Mid-Term-Reform. Others can be guessed at on the basis of specific reform proposals, 
such as price reductions and direct payments foreseen for the sugar market regime. Still, for 
2014 it seems arbitrary to formulate one "future CAP." Rather a comprehensive analysis 
should frame a set of scenarios of how the CAP could look like in 2014, and which 
components and to what degree would be implemented in Turkey in case of accession.  
The second important area of interest in determining the budgetary cost and net transfers to 
Turkey resulting from the CAP is the state of the Turkish agricultural sector at the time of 
accession. As a result of changes in world market prices, technological progress, increasing 
incomes and population, and many other factors, the Turkish agricultural sector will be 
different in 2014. In addition, accession itself will affect the allocation of resources in Turkish 
agriculture.  
A third determining factor for net transfers to Turkey is Turkey's contribution to the EU 
budget in case of accession. As the contribution of member states to the EU budget is mainly 
determined by the size of their GDP, shares in GDP are a good indicator for shares in the EU 
budget. But Turkey's share in the total GDP of a potential EU-29 in 2014 may be very  
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different from that today, as economic growth in the EU-25 (-28) up to 2014 may be different 
from that in Turkey. 
Summarizing all this, an ideal analysis of the budgetary cost and net transfers resulting from 
applying the CAP to Turkey would include the following factors. Different projection 
scenarios would be specified with respect to i) macroeconomic growth until 2014, ii) the 
design of the CAP in 2014, and iii) the steps and speed of phasing in the CAP for Turkey after 
2014. These scenarios would then be fed into a simulation model which depicts the Turkish 
agricultural sector in some detail in order to derive the Turkish composition of agricultural 
production and consumption in 2014 under each of the scenarios. Based on quantity and 
policy data for each of the scenarios, total cost to the EU budget and the resulting net transfers 
to Turkey can be estimated. This, however, goes beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the 
following approach is applied:  
•  Turkey's contribution to the EU budget is calculated based on projected GDP from 
macroeconomic growth scenarios taken from the literature. LEJOUR et al. (2004) project 
real GDP growth for Turkey until accession at 5.6 percent. DERVIS et al. (2004b) project 
Turkish per capita GDP expressed in foreign currency to grow by 6 percent until 
accession, which is equivalent to about 7.2 percent total GDP growth due to population 
growth. This assumption is qualified by a demographic transition leading to a high share 
of economically active population, increased foreign direct investment due to the political 
and economic anchor of the start of accession negotiations, and a yearly appreciation of 
the real exchange rate by 1 percent. QUAISSER and REPPEGATHER (2004) use a yearly 
growth rate of 5 percent for Turkish GDP, which they find optimistic. All authors project 
the GDP growth rate for the EU-25 around 2 percent. For the calculation of Turkey's 
contribution to the EU budget in this study, Turkey's growth rate of total GDP is assumed 
at 5.5 percent which is slightly above the average GDP growth rate of the last four 
decades (DERVIS et al., 2004b). For the EU-27 a GDP growth rate of 2.1 percent is 
assumed.  
•  TURKSIM results from a simulation of full integration of Turkish and EU agricultural 
markets in the year 2006 are used as a quantity framework to determine the level of direct 
payments to Turkey (GRETHE, 2004). These results already include all market effects due 
to full market integration. But they are limited if valued against the comprehensive  
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analysis scheduled above. First, they do not include any reactions of the Turkish 
producers to the CAP, except to those resulting from price changes. This mistake may be 
acceptable, as the most important element of the CAP, except price policies, which are 
direct payments to producers, will largely be decoupled from production in the future. For 
payments not fully decoupled, the usual EU approach is to limit payments to reference 
quantities at a recent level, which also does not allow for strong production effects. 
Another fuzziness of the current TURKSIM analysis results from the fact that projections 
are for the year 2006 and not for 2014. This might slightly underestimate direct payments 
for Turkey due to a somewhat lower reference yield. 
•  The assessment of budgetary costs of applying the CAP to Turkey is based on current 
agricultural policies including those reform steps already decided upon. This analysis is 
limited to the most important budgetary transfers resulting from the CAP: direct payments 
for cereals; oilseeds and protein crops; tobacco; olive oil; cotton; milk; beef, sheep, and 
goat meat, as well as rural development policies. These policies accounted for 84 percent 
of the agricultural budget in 2002, excluding export subsidies.
2 In order not to 
underestimate the real budgetary cost, the remaining 16 percent are added as a lump sum 
for Turkey.
3 It will be argued that this approach substantially overestimates budgetary 
outlays due to expected future reforms. Thus there is a need for some discussion of how 
potential reforms could affect the cost of applying the CAP to Turkey.  
3 Direct  Payments 
In 2004, the EU will spend more than €30 billion on direct payments to agricultural 
producers, more than 60 percent of its agricultural budget. Table 2 shows the budgetary cost 
resulting from fully applying direct payments for selected products under the CAP to Turkish 
agricultural production under the above-described assumptions. 
                                                 
2   Export subsidies are excluded as they will probably be abolished, or at least substantially reduced, in 2014. 
3   This is, of course, a very rough approach. For some of the policies which fall into this category, Turkey 
would get relatively less than current EU members, e.g. for pork market policies; for other policies, more, 
e.g. processing aids for paste tomatoes. Furthermore, 16 percent is a relative measure within the total 
agricultural budget. If the value of direct payments is assumed to decline by 1.5 percent annually, as it is in 
the calculations below, this implies an absolute decline in the amount reserved for "other policies." This may 
be true for some policies, but not for others. In short, this 16 percent is more a reminder of "some substantial 
amount," than a well-founded projection.  
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Table 2: Budgetary Outlays for Direct Payments for Selected Products in Turkey, Full 
Implementation of Current EU Level in 2014 
    Quantity               




(mill. 2004 €) 
Cereals and oilseeds in TURKSIM      
  Eligible quantity (1,000 t) 28,803 51.45 1,482 
  2006 area (1,000 ha)  13,684      
  Base yield (t/ha)  2.1      
Cereals and oilseeds not in TURKSIM    
  Eligible quantity (1,000 t) 842 51.45  43 
  2002 area (1,000 ha)  400      
Proteine crops in TURKSIM     
  Eligible quantity (1,000 t) 3,029 59.21  179 
  2006 area (1,000 ha)  1,439      
Durum  2006 area (1,000 ha)  1,927  113.45  219 
Tobacco  2006 (1,000 t)  237  2,368.56  563 
Olive oil  2006 (1,000 t)  136  1,080.14  147 
Hazelnuts  2006 area (1,000 ha)  987  98.62  97 
Cotton  2006 (1,000 t)  3,248  408.37  1,327 
Milk  2006 (1,000 t)  11,774  28.99  341 
Beef  2006 (1,000 t)  353  967.93  341 
Sheep meat  2006 (1,000 t)  333 1,372.13  457 
Total outlays for direct payments:     5,197 
a Assumptions include: direct payments for milk fully implemented, modulation of 5 percent fully implemented, 
beef premiums/ton 50 percent above EU level as most payments are made per animal and Turkey has a higher 
number of animals/ton of meat produced, direct payments for sugar not yet included, direct payments fixed in 
nominal values, inflation between 2004 and 2012 1.5 percent annually. 
Sources: AGRAEUROPE (2004b), SIS (2003), GRETHE (2004), own calculations. 
Table 2 shows that budgetary outlays for applying direct payments in their current form to 
Turkey for the most important products would total to about €5.2 billion.
4 The largest blocks 
of outlays are for cereals and oilseeds as well as cotton, which together account for €2.8 
billion. 
                                                 
4   This contrasts significantly with the €8 billion of direct payments for Turkey recently brought forward by EU 
Agricultural Commissioner Fischler (AgraEurope, 2004a). Several reasons could contribute to such a 
difference. If direct payments foreseen for sugar growers under the current reform proposal were included, 
this would add about €185 million. In addition, Commissioner Fischler may not have based his statement on 
the drop of direct payments due to their fixation in nominal amounts and modulation, which would add 
another €1.2 billion.  
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But the calculation of such numbers ignores the fact that Turkish producers are very unlikely 
to ever get direct income transfers of such size from the EU budget. This is due to the high 
cost of such payments to the EU budget which will potentially lead to further reform of the 
direct payment system before Turkish accession. For the NMS-10, the direct payments are 
granted at 25 percent of the EU-15 in 2004, and increase until 2013 to the level applicable in 
the EU-15 in that year. This will put considerable pressure on the EU to reform these 
payments because granting direct payments at the current level to the new member states 
would be costly to the EU-15 (WEISE et al., 2002) and probably conflict with the overall 
ceiling on the CAP (AgraEurope, 2004c), especially after accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 
An additional reason for the low probability of Turkish producers receiving significant direct 
payments is the most recent reform, which will fully decouple most direct payments from 
agricultural production in the future. Therefore, the need to establish payments at a 
comparable level in a common market for reasons of competition will become much less 
important in the future. A trend towards nationalization of direct payments may be the result, 
already partially realized through the different level of direct payments in the EU-15 and the 
NMS-10 until 2013, and the possibility of individual countries in the NMS-10 to pay national 
top-ups in addition to the EU direct payments to their producers. In short, direct payments 
will be reduced, probably fully decoupled, and potentially partly nationalized before Turkey 
will become an EU member. Thus any direct payments from the EU budget to Turkish 
producers will be much lower than payments under the current CAP, if any at all. 
As an example, if one assumes that the level of direct payments in the EU is reduced by an 
average annual rate of 3 percent up to 2014, budgetary outlays for full implementation of 
direct payments in Turkey drop to €3.6 billion. Furthermore, it is highly probable that direct 
payments for Turkey would be phased in as they are for the NMS-10 and as they will be for 
Bulgaria and Romania. For those countries, the starting level is 25 percent of the EU level and 
the full level is reached in the tenth year of membership. Such an approach would reduce 
direct payments for Turkey in the initial year of membership to about €900 million. In 2024 
this amount would be about €2 billion, if one assumes that the EU level is reduced further by 
3 percent annually.   
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4  Second Pillar of the CAP 
In contrast to the instrument of direct payments from the EU budget, which will probably 
decline in importance in the future, the second pillar of the CAP is projected to rise: in 2004 
about €8.3 billion or 18 percent of the expenditure on EU agricultural policies are spent on 
this broad policy basket of rural development policies and in its draft Financial Perspective 
for 2007 to 2013, the EU-Commission proposes to increase these payments to €13.2 billion or 
23 percent of the CAP budget in 2013 (AGRAEUROPE, 2004d). Through the modulation 
mechanism, which shifts 5 percent of direct payments to the second pillar of the CAP until 
2007, there is a direct link between the reduction of direct payments in the first pillar and the 
strengthening of the second pillar of the CAP. Current EU payments in the second pillar of 
the CAP are distributed among member states according to historical negotiating power and 
their readiness to co-finance EU funds. But for the allocation of modulation funds, which is 
"new second pillar money," the EU has explicitly established agricultural area, employment 
in agriculture, and GDPPPS per capita as criteria for the allocation of funds.
5 The same criteria 
were used by the European Commission, along with the somewhat nebulous "…specific 
territorial situation in each country" (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002, p. 5) for the allocation of 
Sapard funds to the Central European accession candidates, and in the allocation of rural 
development funds for the NMS-10 as well as Bulgaria and Romania. Based on these criteria 
Turkey would be eligible for a high share of payments under the second pillar of the CAP. 
What could the future level of payments to Turkey be under the second pillar of the CAP? 
The answer to this question can only be guessed at as there is no clearly defined rule of 
allocating second pillar funds to individual member states, whether one of the EU-15, or a 
new member state. Therefore, the following "best guess" is based on the level of rural 
development funds being allocated to the NMS-10 for the period 2004-2006 and to Bulgaria 
and Romania for the period 2007-2009, as well as on the above-mentioned criteria of 
agricultural area, employment, and GDPPPS per capita. Table 3 presents a comparison of those 
criteria for the NMS-10, Romania and Bulgaria, and Turkey in 2002, as well as projections 
for all countries for the (assumed) year of accession. 
                                                 
5   EC Directive 1782/2003, Official Journal of the EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (OJ) L 270, 21.10.2003.  
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Table 3: Criteria for the Allocation of Rural Development Funds to the NMS-10, 
Bulgaria and Romania, and Turkey 
NMS-10 Bulgaria  & 
Romania 
Turkey  Turkey (2014)      








(2014) NMS  10 
(2004) 
B & R 
(2007) 
Agricultural area 
(1,000 ha)  36,139 36,139 20,144 20,144  38,883  38,883 108% 193% 
Agricultural 
employment (1,000)  3,880 3,610
 a 3,982  3,325
 a 7,458 4,839
 a  134% 146% 
GDPPPS per capita 
(2003 €)  11,302 11,641
 b 6,331 7,550
 b 5,750 9,234
b  79% 122% 
a Agricultural employment in Turkey is assumed to continue to decrease by an annual rate of 3.5 percent until 
2014, as it did in 1996 to 2002. For the NMS-10, Bulgaria, and Romania the same annual rate is applied.
 
b GDPPPS per head is assumed to grow in real terms by 3 percent annually between 2003 and 2004 in the NMS-
10. For Bulgaria and Romania the growth rate is assumed at 4.5 percent annually from 2003 to 2007. 
Projections are from EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004b). In Turkey, GDPPPS per head is assumed to grow in real 
terms by an annual rate of 4.4 percent between 2003 and 2014 based on sources cited above.
 
Sources: SIS (2004b), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004a, 2004b), own calculations. 
Table 3 shows that Turkey's agricultural sector is expected to be slightly larger in 2014 than 
that of the NMS-10, and considerably larger than that of Bulgaria and Romania at the time of 
accession in terms of area and employment. The GDPPPS per capita, however, is projected to 
be 21 percent lower than that of the NMS-10 but about 22 percent above that of Bulgaria and 
Romania. The following formula has been chosen to determine the level of rural payments for 
Turkey relative to any reference country group based on the criteria given above:
 6 
(1)    
Turkey reference Turkey reference
Turkey reference
Turkey reference PPS
(0.65     area ratio ) + (0.35     employment ratio )
Factor =
(1 + GDP  ratio )/2
ii
, 
with "reference" standing for the NMS-10 or Bulgaria and Romania, or any average one 
wishes to apply. 
The resulting factor of rural development payments for Turkey compared to the NMS-10 
(FactorTurkey/NMS 10) is 1.3. Rural development funds allocated to the NMS-10 from the 
Guarantee section of the EAGGF are €5.8 billion for the period 2004 to 2006 (EUROPEAN 
                                                 
6   The higher weight of area than employment has been observed for example in the allocation of SAPARD 
funds to Bulgaria and Romania. But as has been mentioned above: any such formula is arbitrary and only a 
very rough anticipation of what could happen in the future.  
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COMMISSION, 2003a), i.e. about €1.9 billion per year.
7 Thus, Turkey would receive about €2.5 
billion of rural development funds in case of accession from the CAP budget if one takes the 
NMS-10 as a reference. Taking Bulgaria and Romania as a reference, the resulting factor is 
1.59. Rural development funds foreseen for Bulgaria and Romania for the period 2007-2009 
are €1 billion annually (AGRA, 2004). Thus, Turkey would receive only about €1.6 billion of 
rural development funds in the first years of membership from the CAP budget if one takes 
Bulgaria and Romania as a reference. For Bulgaria and Romania, in contrast to the NMS-10, 
rural development measures are phased in. In 2009 the level will be at €1.27 billion and it is 
understood, that this amount will increase to about €1.4 billion in later years.
8 If one takes this 
as a reference, the final level of rural development funds from the Guarantee section of the 
EAGGF for Turkey may be at €2.2 billion, which is very close to the figures recently put 
forward by Agricultural Commissioner Fischler (AgraEurope, 2004a). 
To no surprise, equation (1) can not fully explain the allocation of rural development funds to 
new member states – but final results derived from the NMS-10 are rather similar to those 
derived from Bulgaria and Romania. Two reasons lead to the assumption that in accession 
negotiations Turkey would probably end up closer to the allocation of funds based on the 
results for Bulgaria and Romania. First, the Turkish agricultural sector is more similar to that 
of Bulgaria and Romania in terms of its role in the overall economy. Second, Turkey's 
political "leverage" in accession negotiations may be less than that of the first wave of Central 
European accession countries. On the other hand, the decline in direct payments projected 
above may go along with a higher allocation of funds to the second pillar of the CAP, which 
may also enhance rural development funds for newly acceding members. 
5 Conclusions 
The above analysis shows that fully applying an unchanged CAP to Turkey in 2014 would 
cause high costs to the EU budget. Direct payments alone would account for about €5.2 
billion. But the full implementation of the current CAP seems, for many reasons, not an 
option. The estimates made above, which assume direct payments in the EU to decline by 3 
                                                 
7   Rural development measures financed from the Guidance section of the EAGGF, which are much lower, are 
not included here. This is because they fall under the 4 percent of GDP limit for EU structural policies 
discussed below. 
8   This phasing in process and its determinants as well as the determination of final levels are treated in a rather 
intransparent manner. Numbers are fixed in an EU-non-paper.  
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percent annually and a phase-in for Turkey as was applied to the NMS-10 and scheduled for 
Bulgaria and Romania, would see direct payments for Turkey in 2014 at about €900 million, 
which could increase to €2 billion in 2024 when direct payments would be fully phased in. 
EU budgetary outlays for rural development policies in the first years of membership could 
amount to €1.6 to 2.5 billion, depending on whether one takes Bulgaria and Romania or the 
NMS-10 as a reference. As argued above, Bulgaria and Romania may be the more realistic 
reference in terms of political leverage as well as nature of the agricultural sector. Total EU 
budgetary outlays for the application of the CAP to Turkey could then total about €3.3 billion 
in 2014, if one adds the 16 percent budget share for policies except direct payments and rural 
development mentioned above. The total amount could rise to €5 billion in 2024 due to full 
phasing-in of direct payments and rural development policies. 
In total, such payments would imply a significant net transfer from the then EU-28 to Turkey, 
because Turkey's contribution to the EU budget would be limited by its relatively low GDP. 
On the basis of projected GDP shares based on the growth rates presented above, Turkey 
would contribute about 2.9 percent to the EU budget in 2014. If one assumes the EU budget 
for the CAP without Turkey in 2014 at €55.5 billion, which is the level projected under the 
EU draft Financial Perspective for the year 2013, and the budgetary outlays under the CAP 
for Turkey to be at €3.3 billion, Turkey would contribute about €1.7 billion to the EU CAP 
budget. As a result, the net transfer under the CAP to Turkey would be about €1.6 billion in 
2014. Until 2024, the resulting net transfer could increase to €2.6 billion, resulting from 
phasing-in of direct payments and rural development policies, but also a higher contribution 
from Turkey to the EU budget as growth catches up.
9 Are these figures high? In closing these 
amounts are put into perspective from a Turkish as well as an EU point of view. 
For Turkey, a net transfer of €1.6 billion from the CAP would be about 0.3 percent of 
projected total GDP in 2014 and thus relatively small. Total annual EU payments for 
implementing the CAP in Turkey would amount to about 10 percent of projected agricultural 
production value in 2014 and about €680 per capita employed in agriculture. This would 
                                                 
9   As a sensitivity analysis, Turkey's receipts from the CAP and the resulting net transfers were calculated again 
with the GDP growth rate for Turkey being two percentage points lower, i.e. overall GDP growth at 3.5 
percent and GDP/capita growth at 2.4 percent. Under such a scenario Turkey's net receipts resulting from the 
CAP would be at €1.9 billion in 2014 and at €3.6 billion after full phasing-in of direct payments in 2024.  
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increase to about 14 percent of agricultural production value and €1,480 per person employed 
in agriculture in 2024.
10 So for the agricultural sector, transfers resulting from the CAP are 
substantial. On the other hand, applying the CAP in Turkey would go along with significant 
price reductions leading to an estimated loss in producer income of about €1 billion (GRETHE, 
2004: 211), and probably also an abolition of transfers to agricultural producers under the 
current Turkish system of direct payments, which amounted to €1.3 billion in 2003 (OECD, 
2004). 
More important from the Turkish perspective than the resulting net transfers, however, seems 
the degree to which the CAP fits Turkish needs for the development of the agricultural sector. 
Direct payments in the first pillar of the CAP simply shift money to agricultural producers 
which for the most part ends up in the pockets of land owners, so long as payments are linked 
to area. Such transfers may even inhibit the necessary process of improvement of Turkish 
agricultural structure. Transfers of EU funds to Turkey under the second pillar of the CAP 
may hold more interest for Turkey than high direct payments. This is because payments under 
the second pillar can be targeted at measures which are aimed at improving productivity in 
Turkish agriculture, e.g. training farmers or workers who want to leave the sector, public 
investment in rural infrastructure, modernization of the food processing industry, and 
measures to improve the distribution of land among farms such as reparcelling. 
From an EU perspective, Turkey would be a significant recipient of CAP funds. Projections 
made above would estimate Turkey receiving about 5.6 to 8.3 percent of the CAP budget. 
This, although, is not especially high compared to other large EU countries. For example in 
2002 France received about €9.9 billion, which was 21 percent of the CAP budget of the EU-
15. In terms of the net transfer situation resulting from the CAP, Turkey is in the range of 
other acceding countries: net transfers resulting from the CAP to the NMS-10 between 2004 
and 2006 are about €900 million annually, and net transfers resulting from the CAP to 
Romania and Bulgaria are projected at €1.7 billion annually for the period 2007 to 2009.
11 
Some of the EU-15 members received larger net transfers in the past: in 2002 net transfers to 
                                                 
10   Negative growth rates projected for employment in the agricultural sector above are extrapolated to 2024. 
11   Own calculations based on the GDP growth rates presented above, the Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 
(AGRAEUROPE 2004c), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003a, 2004d), and Agra (2004).  
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France resulting from the CAP were about €1.5 billion and for Spain they amounted to €2.9 
billion.
12 
Finally, transfers to Turkey under the CAP can be assessed against the overall project of 
including Turkey in the EU, in budgetary as well as political terms. With respect to the 
budgetary impact of Turkish membership, expected transfers resulting from the CAP are 
much below the transfers which would result from the full implementation of the current EU 
structural policy in Turkey. Because of low income levels, all Turkish regions would be 
eligible to receive funds, and under the current policy rules, the upper limit of payments after 
full phasing-in would be 4 percent of GDP. Based on GDP projections made above, this 
would be about €15.3 billion in 2014. Net transfers resulting from the EU structural policy 
under such a scenario would be about €12.6 billion.
13 However, a slower phasing-in is applied 
to the NMS-10, which receive about €7.2 annually on average for 2004 to 2006 from the 
structural and cohesion funds (EUROPEAN C OMMISSION, 2002), equivalent to about 1.6 
percent of their projected GDP in that period. For Bulgaria and Romania an annual average 
sum of about €2.8 billion is agreed upon for the period 2007-2009 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2004c), about 3 percent of their projected GDP. For both country groups, structural and 
cohesion funds outlays per capita in the first three years of membership are around €90, 
which seems to have been then navigational mark fixing the level of payments for this period. 
If one applies this level to the projected population in Turkey in 2014, Turkey would receive 
€7.6 billion annually and the resulting net transfer would be at €5.2 billion, much higher than 
expected payments and net transfers resulting from the CAP. 
With respect to the overall political project of including Turkey in the EU, costs resulting 
from the CAP seem to take a backseat. The values, interests and opportunities at stake are too 
important to let an annual transfer of about €1.6 to 2.6 billion dominate the discussion. 
Nonetheless, the accession of Turkey may be an additional incentive among many to fully 
decouple and phase out direct payments in the EU. 
                                                 
12   Own calculations based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003b, 2004a). 
13   Own calculations based on projected expenditure for structural policy in the EU-27 in 2013 in the EU draft 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004c).  
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